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Majorities May Limit the People's
Liberties Only When Authorized To Do
So by the Constitutiont
BERNARD H. SIEGAN*
This nation has had two centuries in which to contemplate and
develop rules of constitutional interpretation, and this opportunity
has not been ignored. Of the many theories available to aid Supreme
Court Justices in construing the fundamental law, most relate to the
role of original understanding. At present, the major dispute is be-
tween those who believe that the Constitution should be construed in
accordance with original textual meaning, and those willing to de-
part from this meaning to reach what the interpreter believes will be
a result more in keeping with modern society.
I agree with Judge Robert Bork that original textual meaning
must be observed, for this concern is, in my view, a basic precept of
a society of laws. The existence of a principled legal system requires
a societal commitment to enforce the meanings and intentions of
those who author laws and legal documents.'
My difference with Bork lies in interpreting the meaning of the
constitutional text.' We disagree about a matter of highest impor-
tance: What powers do the federal and state legislatures have to
limit individual liberties? Bork represents the majoritarian position
that "[t]he only thing majorities may not do is invade the liberties
the Constitution specifies." 3 This is opposite to the individualist posi-
tion that majorities may invade the people's liberties only when spe-
cifically or implicitly authorized by the Constitution. This article fo-
t Copyright © 1990 Bernard H. Siegan.
* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego.
1. B. SIEGAN, ECONOMIc LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 7-21 (1980).
2. See R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990).
3. Id. at 147.
cuses on the difference between these two views, and supports the
individualist position. My inquiry is divided into five parts: First, the
original Constitution; second, the Bill of Rights; third, section one of
the fourteenth amendment; fourth, the due process clauses; and fifth,
judicial responsibility.
When courts interpret laws and legal documents, they usually seek
to determine the meaning of the text as written. There being no pro-
vision in the document or common law rule to the contrary, the same
undertaking is appropriate for construing the United States Consti-
tution. Accordingly, applying traditional interpretive techniques, an
exploration of constitutional meaning should begin with a reading of
the text. On their face, the documents of concern in this article, ei-
ther together or separately, do not reveal the extent of the federal or
state powers to limit liberties. A more sophisticated reading of them
is required, taking into consideration extrinsic matters that explain
the text, such as its history and societal context. For the problem at
hand, I do not believe an inquiry into these extrinsic sources will
settle it, although this will greatly help in its ultimate resolution.
The next step in exploring constitutional meaning is to discern the
meanings and intentions of the Framers as expressed while the docu-
ment was written. Explanations that the Framers presented after the
final drafting are useful, but not always persuasive, since the Fram-
ers may have been influenced by subsequent events. We may also be
able to comprehend meaning by considering extrinsic information
bearing on the Framers' meaning, such as their philosophical inclina-
tions and the authorities on whom they relied. Ratifying debates, le-
gal decisions, and media stories and comments may also be
informative.
In the following discussion, I shall attempt to utilize the sources of
information as described above, but not always in the order
described.
I. THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION
A. Text
In the ratification debates, the Antifederalists-proponents were
labeled "Federalists," and opponents "Antifederalists"-charged
that the Constitution created a strong, national government that se-
riously jeopardized the sovereignty of the states and the liberty of
the people. They contended that in relation to the people's liberties,
voting majorities were decisive except when the Constitution specifi-
cally protected freedom. Since few liberties were safeguarded, the
Constitution created a frighteningly powerful national state. The
Antifederalists were correct in their count of liberties: a small num-
ber were secured. The federal government was limited in power to
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suspend the writ of habeas corpus, 4 to levy taxes,5 to pass bills of
attainder or ex post facto laws;6 jury trials were required in all crim-
inal matters, usually to be held within the state where committed;7
treason was defined and its punishment confined;8 and no religious
test was required as a qualification for any office under the United
States government.9 No other personal guarantees were provided.
However, the absence of personal protections is not a decisive fac-
tor in determining the authority of the proposed government. Ac-
cording to James Madison, the Constitution would never have been
ratified if the people believed that all unstated liberties were totally
under the control of the federal government.10 In the ratification de-
bates, the Federalists denied such assertions and, as the subsequent
discussion will show, were correct in this interpretation. According to
them, the proposed national government was one of limited and enu-
merated powers; it possessed only those powers specifically vested in
it. Theophilus Parsons of Massachusetts, a leading Federalist who
was later to become Chief Justice of Massachusetts, asserted that
the Antifederalist fears of a powerful national government were
groundless since "[n]o power . . . was given to Congress to infringe
on any one of the natural rights of the people by this Constitution;
and, should they attempt it without constitutional authority, the act
would be a nullity and could not be enforced."" Madison agreed:
"every power not granted thereby remains with the people, and at
their will."' 2 James Wilson, an influential member of the Constitu-
tional Convention and later a Supreme Court Justice, explained that
it was not necessary to be more definitive:
[E]very thing which is not given, is reserved .... [I]t would have been
superfluous and absurd, to have stipulated with a federal body of our own
creation, that we should enjoy those privileges, of which we are not divested
either by the intention or the act that has brought that body into
existence.1'
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
5. Id. art. I, § 8.
6. Id. art. I, § 9.
7. Id. art. III, § 2.
8. Id. art. III, § 3.
9. Id. art. VI.
10. See 3 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
435 (rev. ed. 1937) (letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane, Sept. 2, 1819).
11. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 538
(1969).
12. 3 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 620 (J. Elliot
ed. 1888) [hereinafter DEBATES].
13. Address by James Wilson to a meeting of the citizens of Philadelphia (1787),
reprinted in 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 529
The Federalists contended that the national government was so
limited in power that a bill of rights was unnecessary; moreover, an
enumeration of specific rights might be harmful because first, it
would imply the existence of power where there was none, and sec-
ond, it might not list all rights that were protected, to the detriment
of those omitted. In No. 84 of The Federalist Papers, Alexander
Hamilton argued against any need for including a bill of rights in
the constitution. He asserted that the proposed document was in-
tended to regulate not personal and private concerns, but rather, the
nation's general political interests. "[T]he people surrender nothing,
and as they retain every thing, they have no need of particular reser-
vations." Therefore, a bill of rights was superfluous. Such a declara-
tion might even be dangerous, Hamilton thought, because it would
contain various exceptions of powers that were not conferred, and to
this extent would furnish a "colorable pretext" for claiming more
than was granted-possibly by those disposed to usurpation. "For
why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to
do?,,:
4
Any notion that the Framers sought to establish an authoritarian
government is false. The people that authored the Declaration of In-
dependence were not about to substitute one despotism for another.
Their concerns were otherwise. The search for a way to control and
restrict the powers of elected representatives dominated the politics
of the Confederation period. 15
The ratification debates reveal that the protection of the individual
from government was then a predominant political concern. The idea
was widespread that government was by its nature hostile to human
liberty and happiness, and was especially susceptible to corruption
and despotism. John Locke's position was widely held, that the state
is a necessary evil to which only powers essential to the common
good should be granted.'6 Thus, the political environment in the
states in the late eighteenth century supported the Federalist inter-
pretation of the Constitution.
According to the Federalist view, the establishment of the consti-
tutional government did not affect the fundamental or natural rights
of the governed unless such an outcome was expressly provided for
within the Constitution itself. The Constitution did not create those
(1971).
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513 (A. Hamilton) (Mentor 1961).
15. G. WOOD, supra note 11, at 376. According to Professor Storing, there was
unity in belief among the Federalists and Antifederalists on at least one critical point:
"[t]he purpose of government is the regulation and thereby the protection of individual
rights and that the best instrument for this purpose is some form of limited, republican
government." H. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 5 (1981).
16. R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DO-
MAIN 7-31 (1985); B. SIEGAN, supra note 1, at 34-36.
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rights, and therefore, it was not a source to which courts could turn
for guidance about their breadth and character, except insofar as the
document restrained and modified them. Pursuant to the position
taken by the Federalists, the judiciary, as the interpreter of the Con-
stitution, would be obliged to enforce liberties of the people by an-
nulling laws that violated them.
In Federalist No. 78, Hamilton asserted that the reservations of
rights would amount to nothing if the Supreme Court could not de-
clare void those acts contrary to the Constitution.17 Since few liber-
ties were specified or defined, how would the courts know which lib-
erties to protect, and to what extent? The answer is that the people
possessed rights under the common law which the Supreme Court
could invoke as required.
The common law, then and now, in England and America, consists
of judge-made law, which often protects individual liberties. When
they arrived in America, the English colonists applied the only law
they knew: the law of England with its emphasis on the common
law. According to James Otis, the well-known political leader from
Massachusetts, writing in 1764, the common law "is received and
practiced upon [in Massachusetts Bay], and in the rest of the colo-
nies; and all antient and modern acts of parliament that can be con-
sidered as part of, or in amendment of the common law.""' Although
by then it vigorously condemned the English abuse of power, in
1774, the First Continental Congress declared that the English colo-
nies were entitled to the protections of the common law of
England.' 9
In the revolutionary period, lawyers and political and intellectual
leaders frequently supported their arguments about personal rights
by citing the commentaries of Lord Edward Coke (1552-1634) and
Sir William Blackstone (1723-1780), the leading interpreters of the
common law.20 For decades, American lawyers studied Coke and
Blackstone as their preparation for legal practice. Professor Boorstin
advises us that Blackstone's Commentaries was
the first important and the most influential systematic statement of the
principles of the common law. For generations of English lawyers, it has
17. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 78, at 466 (A. Hamilton) (Mentor 1961).
18. 1 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 584 (1953).
19. Declarations and Resolves of the First Continental Congress, 14 Oct. 1774,
reprinted in THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: THE GREAT DOCUMENTS 1774-
1789, at 1-5 (C. Tansill ed. 1972).
20. B. SIEGAN, supra note 1, at 8, 34-37, 88-89.
been both the foremost coherent statement of the subject of their study, and
the citadel of their legal tradition. To lawyers on this side of the Atlantic, it
has been even more important. In the first century of American indepen-
dence, the Commentaries were not merely an approach to the study of law;
for most lawyers they constituted all there was of the law . . . . And many
an early American lawyer might have said, with Chancellor Kent, that "he
owed his reputation to the fact that when studying law . . . he had but one
book, Blackstone's Commentaries, but that one book he mastered.'2
Blackstone's interpretations were referred to in the Constitutional
Convention and in the Federalist Papers.
Lord Coke, the eminent attorney general, jurist, legislator, and le-
gal commentator interpreted the common law as safeguarding indi-
vidual liberty. He early provided support for judicial review in his
famous dictum in Dr. Bonham's Case,22 decided by the Court of
Common Pleas in 1610. There, Coke ruled that the London College
of Physicians was not entitled, under an act of Parliament, to punish
Bonham for practicing medicine without its license. Coke declared:
And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will con-
troul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void:
for when an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or re-
pugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it,
and adjudge such Act to be void ....
Apparently not much basis exists in the precedents for this dicta,
and if followed in England, it was not for long. However, in
America, it was used as support for judicial review and for challeng-
ing English rule. Notwithstanding Blackstone's committment to the
sovereignty of Parliament, American commentators emphasized the
importance he placed on the "absolute" rights of life, liberty and
property.24 Blackstone believed the principal end of sovereignty is to
protect the enjoyment of these absolute rights, which were subject
only to "[r]estraints in themselves so gentle and moderate, as will
appear upon farther enquiry, that no man of sense or probity would
wish to see them slackened."25 To vindicate these rights when vio-
lated, the people were entitled first, to seek judicial relief; second, to
petition the king and parliament; and lastly, to use armed force. 20
The Constitution was drafted within the context of the common
law, as James Kent explained in his authoritative Commentaries on
American Law:
21. D. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW at 3 (1941) (quoting C.
WARREN, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR at 187 (1911)).
22. 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (1610).
23. Id. at 652. See Plunknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARV. L
REv. 30, 36 (1926). Plunknett cited numerous instances when courts from the middle of
the fourteenth century to Coke's day ignored statutes of Parliament or disregarded their
plain meaning.
24. B. SIEGAN, supra note 1, at 36-37; 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *125,
130, 134, 156.
25. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *140.
26. Id.
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It was not to be doubted that the constitution and laws of the United States
were made in reference to the existence of the common law. . . . In many
cases, the language of the constitution and laws would be inexplicable with-
out reference to the common law; and the existence of the common law is
not only supposed by the constitution, but it is appealed to for the construc-
tion and interpretation of its powers.2 7
The ratification arguments over the protection of press freedom
provide an illustration of the function the judiciary would exercise in
securing liberties. Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 84 that there
was no need to be concerned about securing press freedom, inasmuch
as the Constitution does not grant the government any power to re-
strain it. 8 Does this mean, then, that as far as the national govern-
ment is concerned, freedom of the press is absolute, and not subject
to any restraint? James Wilson explained during the ratification de-
bates that freedom of the press was subject to the powers of govern-
ment under the common law, which were then considerable. 9 In
other words, the national government had no power to diminish free-
dom of the press as the term was defined under the common law.
However, the national government could still penalize criminal libel
under its authority in criminal matters.
From this example, it is apparent that the judiciary would have a
large role in defining and protecting freedom, not an unusual role for
judges at the time of the framing of the Constitution. In that period,
common law tradition espoused the progressive enlargement of the
people's liberties. In applying the common law, judges changed it
continually pursuant to new understandings and conditions. From
the earliest years of the English state, judges and parliament created
and steadily expanded common law protections; while at one time
only the meager rudiments of criminal procedure were required, by
Blackstone's day "absolute rights" to life, liberty and property were
acknowledged.
When the Constitution was framed, the judiciary was highly re-
garded as a guardian of individual rights. Hamilton praised the
American judiciary: "The benefits of the integrity and moderation of
27. 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 315-16 (Da Capo 1971).
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 14, at 513-14.
29. PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1787-1788, at 308-09 (J.
McMaster & F. Stone eds. 1888). According to Blackstone, liberty of the press
consists in no previous restraints upon publications, and not freedom from cen-
sure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted
right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid this, is to
destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischie-
vous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own temerity.
4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *151-52.
the judiciary have already been felt in more states than one; and
though they may have displeased those whose sinister expectations
they may have disappointed, they must have commanded the esteem
and applause of all the virtuous and disinterested.1 30 For many
Americans, the unwritten English constitution, which consisted prin-
cipally of common law rights, provided a great measure of human
freedom. As historian Gordon S. Wood has put it, "what made their
Revolution seem so unusual [was that] they revolted not against the
English constitution but on behalf of it."' a
Although the English Parliament possessed absolute authority to
enact and repeal legislation, English custom and tradition required
that it honor and observe the unwritten constitution that protected
individual rights. Parliament rarely overruled the common law, and
when it did, it did so narrowly and mostly to clarify ambiguities.
Thus, as a practical matter, the English Parliament was limited in
its authority to infringe liberties.
Justice William Bradley once explained that "England has no
written constitution, it is true; but it has an unwritten one, resting in
the acknowledged, and frequently declared, privileges of Parliament
and the people, to violate which in any material respect would pro-
duce a revolution in an hour." 32 In this opinion, Bradley espoused
the position that American legislatures possessed no greater power
over individual rights than Parliament; or as he put it, "[t]he people
of this country brought with them to its shores the rights of English-
men." 33 Hamilton voiced a similar opinion when he said, "Our an-
cestors, when they emigrated to this country, brought with them the
common law, as their inheritance and birthright ....,3"
Thomas Cooley was a justice of the Michigan Supreme Court and
regarded as the leading legal commentator in the last half of the
nineteenth century, succeeding for many in the legal community the
authoritative status of Blackstone and Kent. He wrote in 1868 that
the English legal experience is relevant in interpreting the power of
American legislatures:
The maxims of Magna Charta and the common law are the interpreters of
constitutional grants of power, and those acts which by those maxims the
several departments of government are forbidden to do cannot be consid-
ered within any grant or apportionment of power which the people in gen-
eral terms have made to those departments. The Parliament of Great Brit-
ain, indeed, as possessing the sovereignty of the country, has the power to
disregard fundamental principles, and pass arbitrary and unjust enact-
30. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 17, at 470.
31. G. WOOD, supra note 11, at 10.
32. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 115 (1873) (Bradley, J.,
dissenting).
33. Id. at 114.
34. People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337, 344 (N.Y. 1804) (argument presented
in behalf of defendant).
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ments; but it cannot do this rightfully, and it has the power to do so simply
because there is no written constitution from which its authority springs or
on which it depends, and by which the courts can test the validity of its
declared will. The rules which confine the discretion of Parliament within
the ancient landmarks are rules for the construction of the powers of the
American legislatures; and however proper and prudent it may be expressly
to prohibit those things which are not understood to be within the proper
attributes of legislative power, such prohibition can never be regarded as
essential, when the extent of the power apportioned to the legislative de-
partment is considered, and appears not to be broad enough to cover the
obnoxious authority. The absence of such prohibition cannot, by implica-
tion, confer power.35
The foregoing discussion concerns primarily the constitutional lim-
itations on the national government's powers to proscribe the peo-
ple's liberties. The position that majorities reign under the Constitu-
tion is stronger when applied to the state governments, which
already existed and were not created by the Constitution. One might
ordinarily believe the states continued to retain all powers except
those the Constitution specifically denied them. However, many
early judges construed the fundamental law to embody the principle
that all legislatures are inherently limited in power. None had the
authority to deprive people of their natural liberties.
In Calder v. Bull (1798),36 Justice Chase asserted that under the
national Constitution, the federal and state legislatures were without
power to overrule certain vital principles of free republican govern-
ment. It would have been senseless, he argued, for people to entrust
their legislatures with such powers. They will therefore not be pre-
sumed to have done so unless it were so specified. 7 Consequently, in
Wilkinson v. Leland (1829)38 Justice Story concluded:
The fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require, that the
rights of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred. At
least no court of justice in this country would be warranted in assuming,
that the power to violate and disregard them; a power so repugnant to the
common principles of justice and civil liberty; lurked under any general
grant of legislative authority, or ought to be implied from any general ex-
pressions of the will of the people. The people ought not to be presumed to
part with rights so vital to their security and well being .... 39
In Fletcher v. Peck (1810),4o per Chief Justice Marshall, and in
Terrett v. Taylor (1815), 41 per Justice Story, the United States Su-
35. T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 175-76 (1868).
36. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
37. Id. at 387-89.
38. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627 (1829).
39. Id. at 657.
40. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
41. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815).
preme Court struck down state legislation, in part or in whole, on the
basis that the nature of society itself restrains legislative power, even
in matters on which federal and state constitutions are silent. In
these two cases, the state legislatures had enacted retrospective legis-
lation divesting owners of property they had acquired in good faith.
Both justices invoked a natural law principle that forbade the legis-
,lature from appropriating property without compensating the owner.
Marshall asserted a view which has been much cited in the cases: "It
may well be doubted, whether the nature of society and of govern-
ment does not prescribe some limits to the legislative power; and if
any be prescribed, where are they to be found, if the property of an
individual, fairly and honestly acquired, may be seized without
compensation? '42
Marshall's acceptance of natural law principles is also indicated in
this passage from his dissenting opinion in an 1827 case:
[I]ndividuals do not derive from government their right to contract, but
bring that right with them into society; that obligation is not conferred on
contracts by positive law, but is intrinsic, and is conferred by the act of the
parties. This results from the right which every man retains to acquire
property, to dispose of that property according to his own judgment, and to
pledge himself for a future act. These rights are not given by society, but
are brought into it. The right of coercion is necessarily surrendered to gov-
ernment, and this surrender imposes on government the correlative duty of
furnishing a remedy.43
James Kent followed Marshall and Story in upholding the natural
law principles, stating in an opinion he wrote in 1811 as Chancellor
of New York that judges were not to be confined by the rights enu-
merated in constitutions:
Our constitutions do not admit the power assumed by the Roman prince;
and the principle we are considering [no retroactive laws] is now to be re-
garded as sacred. It is not pretended that we have any express constitu-
tional provisions on the subject; nor have we any for numerous other rights
dear alike to freedom and justice.44
Kent wrote that a statute "affecting and changing vested rights is
very generally considered in this as founded on unconstitutional prin-
ciples, and consequently inoperative and void." Kent did not mean
by "unconstitutional," contrary to the provisions of the document,
but rather, contrary to what he considered to be general limitations
implicit in it, based on natural rights and the nature of social
42. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 135.
43. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 346-47 (1827) (Marshall, C.J.,
dissenting). Moreover, according to Marshall, the Framers of the Constitution were inti-
mately acquainted with writings on natural law that declare that contracts possess an
original, instrinsic obligation not given by government. Because of this knowledge, Mar-
shall opined that "[w]e must suppose, that the framers of our constitution took the same
view of the subject, and the language they have used confirms this opinion." Id. at 354.
44. Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 505 (N.Y. 1811).
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compact."
Nor were the aforementioned opinions isolated ones. According to
the well-regarded constitutional scholar Edward Corwin, during the
initial period of federal constitutional history, which closed about
1830, leading judges and lawyers accepted the ideas of natural rights
and the social compact as bases for constitutional decisions." Profes-
sor J.A.C. Grant reported that between 1816 and 1860, high or fed-
eral courts in New York, New Jersey, New Hampshire, Georgia,
Maryland, Arkansas, and Iowa held or expressed the belief that nat-
ural justice required that compensation must be paid when private
property is taken for public use.47 Marshall, Story, Kent, and most
federal judges were of Federalist persuasion, something that they
had in common with most delegates to the Constitutional Conven-
tion. Hence, the views of these judges may well represent those at
the Convention.
Natural law also dominated intellectual thinking of the period.
American constitutional and bill of rights models were constructed
at a time when the natural law school of judicial thought was highly
influential, and the early evolution of American law coincided with a
high tide of individualistic ethics and economics. As Professor Archi-
bald Cox has observed: "Belief in natural rights and natural law
were deeply ingrained in the eighteenth-century American mind de-
spite uncertainty whether their source was the King, of Kings and
Lord of all the earth, the immutable maxims of reason and justice,
or the accumulated wisdom of English common law."148
B. The Framers' Intentions
The deliberations at the Constitutional Convention show that the
delegates sought to strengthen and improve the government existing
under the Articles of Confederation to achieve two objectives: First,
to create a self-sufficient and limited central government, and sec-
ond, to prevent the states from restraining and discouraging private
commerce. No thought was given to limiting individual rights. While
states had adopted bills of rights, the Framers of the federal Consti-
45. See P. BREST & S. LEVINSON, PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING
116 (1983).
46. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 MICH. L.
REV. 247 (1914).
47. Grant, The Natural Law Background of Due Process, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 56
(1931).
48. A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 31
(1976).
tution rejected the idea: a proposal made during the Constitutional
Convention to establish a committee to draft a bill of rights was de-
feated by a vote of ten states to none.49 Given that many delegates to
the Convention were greatly concerned about personal freedom, this
vote suggests a consensus that a bill of rights was not required to
guarantee liberties. Another possible explanation, that the Framers
did not want to protect freedom, is not credible. To the best of my
knowledge, no Framer favored strong or absolute governmental pow-
ers over the people's liberties.
Thereafter, it was moved for inclusion of a provision "that the lib-
erty of the Press should be inviolably observed."50 The states voted
against the motion, either seven to four, or six to five. The accounts
show that Roger Sherman of Connecticut stated the protection was
unnecessary, inasmuch as the power of Congress did not extend to
the press. 1 This is additional support for the limited government
theory. In Hamilton's opinion, expressed after the Convention, "the
constitution is itself in every rational sense, and to every useful pur-
pose, A BILL OF RIGHTS," prescribing the limits of governmental
authority."
In the ratification debates, the Federalists pointed out that the
constitutional text itself showed that the authority of the national
government was limited. If the national legislature was to be all
powerful, they asked, why does article I, section 8 carefully spell out
the powers of Congress? They denied that the necessary and proper
clause at the end of section 8 was open ended, or that it modified the
severe limitations on the Congress previously expressed. Accounts of
the Constitutional Convention show the Framers engaged in exten-
sive and sometimes vitriolic debate on whether certain powers should
be authorized.53 These exercises would have been without purpose
had the Congress enjoyed broad, undefined powers.
The delegates actually turned down an effort to give Congress im-
mense powers. The Committee of Detail recommended that Con-
gress be given the sweeping power to provide "for the well managing
and securing the common property and general interests and welfare
of the United States," but this proposal did not appear in any drafts
of the Constitution. 4 The Convention refused to empower the na-
tional government to act in many areas: to set up temporary govern-
49. 2 M. Farrand, supra note 10, at 582, 587-88.
50. Id at 617.
51. Id. at 618.
52. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 14, at 515.
53. Six prominent delegates refused to sign the Constitution for a variety of rea-
sons, including their concern about powers of the central government. See C. BOWEN,
MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA 34, 254-64 (1986).
54. I. BRANT, THE FOURTH PRESIDENT: THE LIFE OF JAMES MADISON 186 (1970).
See also id. at 187-88.
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ments in new states; to grant charters of incorporation; to create
seminaries for the promotion of literature and the arts; to establish
public institutions, rewards and immunities for the promotion of ag-
riculture, commerce, trades, and manufactures; to regulate stages on
the post road; to establish a university; to encourage, by proper pre-
miums and provisions, the advancement of useful knowledge and dis-
coveries; to provide for opening and establishing canals; to emit bills
of credit (which then meant printing unbacked paper for circulation
as currency); and to make sumptuary laws. Each of these proposals
was introduced, and was either voted down or not further considered
outside of committee.55
The Framers' debate on whether Congress should have the power
to print paper money not backed by precious metals is instructive on
their meaning of enumerated authority. Because the powers to bor-
row money and to emit bills of credit had been granted to Congress
under the Articles of Confederation, they were automatically ex-
tended to the new government in an early draft of the Constitution
prepared by the Committee of Detail. Gouverneur Morris of Penn-
sylvania opposed giving Congress the power to emit bills of credit,
and he moved to strike the phrase authorizing it.56 Apparently, the
delegates believed the absence of language permitting emission was
enough to deny Congress this authority. Although most o .legates op-
posed granting this power, and the states voted nine to two in sup-
port of Morris' motion, no delegate sought to insert a specific ban.57
As would be expected from the earlier discussion, the natural law
perspective existed at the Constitutional Convention. When the
prohibitions on attainder and ex post facto laws were introduced, Ol-
iver Ellsworth, a Connecticut delegate who later became Chief Jus-
tice of the United States Supreme Court, argued that these protec-
tions were superfluous, stating that "there was no lawyer, no civilian
who would not say that ex post facto laws were void of them-
selves."58 James Wilson likewise opposed inserting the prohibitions,
explaining that "[i]t will bring reflexions on the Constitution-and
proclaim that we are ignorant of the first principles of Legislation, or
are constituting a Government which will be so."' 51 Prohibitions
against such laws were still inserted, apparently under the theory, as
55. B. SIEGAN, supra note 1, at 100; see I. BRANT supra note 54, at 181-89.
56. 2 M. FARRAND supra note 10, at 308-09.
57. B. SIEGAN, THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSTITUTION 22-26 (1987).
58. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 10, at 376.
59. Id.
subsequently explained by Edmund Randolph, that they were excep-
tions from particular powers vested by the Constitution that other-
wise might be construed as authorizing their passage." In Federalist
No. 44, James Madison displayed his belief in natural rights doc-
trine in the following passage:
Bills of Attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of
contracts, are contrary to the first principles of social compact, and to every
principle of sound legislation. The two former are expressly prohibited by
the declarations prefixed to some of the State Constitutions, and all of them
are prohibited by the spirit and scope of these fundamental charters.6
As a member of the first Congress, Roger Sherman drafted a pro-
posed bill of rights which was recently discovered. It contained a
"natural rights" provision: "The people have certain natural rights
which are retained by them when they enter into Society." He then
went on to name them (religion, property, expression, assembly, and
so on), and concluded: "Of these rights therefore they shall not be
deprived by the Government of the United States."6
Another Framer expressing belief in natural law was William Pat-
erson, who later became a Supreme Court Justice. In 1795, Justice
Paterson stated, in an opinion he delivered while on circuit in Penn-
sylvania, that the "right of acquiring and possessing property, and
having it protected, is one of the natural, inherent, and unalienable
rights of man. . . .The legislature, therefore, had no authority to
make an act divesting one citizen of his freehold, and vesting it in
another, without a just compensation,""
Alexander Hamilton had similar views-as a prominent lawyer of
the period, this should not be surprising. In a 1796 opinion that he
wrote as a practicing attorney, he said property was immune from
legislation that violated natural law:
Without pretending to judge of the original merits or demerits of the pur-
chasers, it may be safely said to be a contravention of the first principles of
natural justice and social policy, without any judicial decision of facts, by a
positive act of the legislature, to revoke a grant of property regularly made
for valuable consideration, under legislative authority, to the prejudice even
of third person on every supposition innocent of the alleged fraud or corrup-
tion .... 64
60. 3 DEBATES, supra note 12, at 464-65.
61. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 282 (J. Madison) (Mentor 1961). The clauses
were inserted according to Madison, because "[o]ur own experience has taught us...
that additional fences against these dangers ought not to be omitted." Id.
62. D. CRUMP, E. GRESSMAN & S. REISS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 519-20 (1989).
63. Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (1795).
64. B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 22 (1938). The
opinion related to the matter subsequently litigated in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87 (1810).
Hamilton wrote in 1774: "The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for,
among old parchments, or musty records. They are written, as with a sun beam, in the
whole volume of human nature, by the hand of the divinity itself; and can never be
[VOL, 27: 309, 1990] People's Liberties
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
I do not know that a natural rights prospective prevailed at the
convention. That it was very important in that period is clear. In any
event, the evidence is persuasive that the Framers produced a docu-
ment consistent with the general tenents of natural law, that majori-
ties could not infringe the natural rights of the people.
II. BILL OF RIGHTS
On June 8, 1789, Congressman James Madison introduced in the
first House of Representatives a series of amendments to the Consti-
tution that would protect the exercise of named and unnamed rights.
Over the next months, Congress debated and considered the matter,
and on October 2, 1789 transmitted to the states for ratification, 5
amendments embodying most of Madison's proposals. The framing
of these amendments was prompted by a number of considerations.
First, to assure the ratification of the Constitution, the Federalists
promised they would seek to amend it after ratification to include a
bill of rights. Second, the Federalists were concerned that failure to
do so might result in the calling of another Constitutional Conven-
tion, which they strongly opposed. In May 1789, both Virginia and
New York had requested Congress to convene a second Constitu-
tional Convention. Third, North Carolina and Rhode Island had still
not ratified the Constitution, presumably in part because of the, ab-
sence of a bill of rights. Fourth, Massachusetts, South Carolina,
New Hampshire, Virginia, and New York submitted along with
their ratifications recommendations that certain amendments be
adopted. Virginia went so far as to recommend inclusion of twenty
provisions in a proposed bill of rights. 66
Congress' task was to select rights that would accomplish the nor-
mative purpose of protecting liberty, as well as the pragmatic objec-
tive of satisfying the public's concerns in this area. The solution
rested in protecting both enumerated and unenumerated rights. This
problem of enumeration had been discussed during the ratification
debates, and I have previously reported Hamilton's objection to
guaranteeing specific liberties.6
In this regard, the remarks of two future Supreme Court Justices,
erased or obscured." 1 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 122 (H.C. Syrett ed. 1961).
65. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
66. See D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
226 (1990); THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: THE GREAT DOCUMENTS 1774-
1789, at 1009-59 (C. Tansill ed. 1972).
67. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
James Wilson and James Iredell, during the ratification debates are
worthy of note, since these remarks likewise presage the framing of
amendments to secure both named and unnamed liberties. As a
member of the Convention, Wilson participated in the actual draft-
ing of the Constitution. He asserted that an effort by the Convention
to protect everyone's liberties would have been futile. "[I]n no one of
those books [by the great political writers], nor in the aggregate of
them all, can you find a complete enumeration of rights appertaining
to the people as men and as citizens." Wilson rejected the idea:
"Enumerate all the rights of men! I am sure, sirs, that no gentlemen
in the late Convention would have attempted such a thing." 8 More-
over, as a legal matter, "every thing that is not enumerated is pre-
sumed to be given." Therefore, the consequence of an imperfect enu-
meration "would throw all implied power into the scale of the
government, and the rights of the people would be rendered incom-
plete."' 69 Iredell fully agreed in addressing the North Carolina ratify-
ing convention:
[I]t would be not only useless, but dangerous, to enumerate a number of
rights which are not intended to be given up; because it would be implying,
in the strongest manner, that every right not included in the exception
might be impaired by the government without usurpation; and it would be
impossible to enumerate every one. Let anyone make what collection or
enumeration of rights he pleases, I will immediately mention twenty or
thirty more rights not contained in it.70
In his speech introducing the proposed amendments, Madison sim-
ilarly expressed concern that a bill of rights might not encompass
protections for all the people's liberties:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating par-
ticular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights
which were not placed in that enumeration; and it might follow by implica-
tion, that those rights which were not singled out, were intended to be as-
signed into the hands of the General Government, and were consequently
insecure. This is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard
against the admission of a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive,
that it may be guarded against. I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see
by turning to the last clause of the fourth resolution. 1
The said clause became, in time, the ninth amendment, and read
initially in Madison's draft as follows:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in favor of par-
ticular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance
of other rights retained by the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated
by the Constitution; but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as
inserted merely for greater caution.72
68. 2 DEBATES, supra note 12, at 424 (remarks of J. Wilson).
69. D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, supra note 66, at 224.
70. Id.
71. 1 THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
439 (J. Gales and W. Seaton eds. 1834).
72. Id. at 435.
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The final form of the ninth amendment is essentially a shorter ver-
sion of this provision: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of cer-
tain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others re-
tained by the people."'7
Federalist arguments such as those delivered by Madison, Hamil-
ton, Wilson, and Iredell made inevitable the inclusion of the ninth
amendment in the Bill of Rights. After continually asserting the
problem of securing all rights, the Federalists, faced with fulfilling
their commitment to frame a bill of rights, could scarcely have omit-
ted protection for those not mentioned. Madison's original list of
enumerated rights and the list Congress adopted contained a far
lesser number than the five states had recommended in their ratifica-
tions. The ninth amendment provides an explicit basis for enforcing
these other rights.
Perhaps more than any other provision, the ninth amendment dis-
closes the intended constitutional relationship between governor and
governed. As the Federalists explained during the ratification period,
the federal government was not granted authority to abridge the
people's liberties, whether identified or not, except when so provided
in the Constitution. The rights specifically protected in the original
Constitution must have been those of greatest concern to the Fram-
ers. They expected that the judiciary would secure these few speci-
fied rights as well as the greater number they did not specify. The
Framers of the Bill of Rights followed the same approach. Under the
pressures generated during and after the ratification proceedings,
they specified the rights they considered of greatest concern. Simi-
larly, they anticipated the judiciary would safeguard these, as well as
those not named. The ninth amendment was the vehicle they used
for the latter purpose. Without this amendment, unenumerated
rights might not be protected, and freedom would have been less se-
cure than under the original Constitution, which safeguarded all lib-
erties whether or not specified. The amendment did not accord the
federal judiciary more authority than it already possessed.
III. SECTION 1 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. Text
When the fourteenth amendment was framed in 1866, the only
specific federal restraints on the states were the relatively few con-
73. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
tained in the original Constitution and the thirteenth amendment,
which abolished slavery. The Bill of Rights was applicable only to
the federal government and not to the states. By then, the federal
judiciary imposed few natural rights limitations on the states. Ac-
cordingly, at that time, on most matters, voting majorities reigned in
the states except when limited by their own constitutions. The sec-
ond sentence of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment was intended
to limit the powers of the states and their officials to diminish liber-
ties. It reads as follows:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 74
While opinion is divergent as to the full meaning of this provision,
commentators do agree that at the minimum, it was intended to au-
thorize passage of and to "constitutionalize" the Civil Rights Act of
1866 5-that is, to assure that the latter's provisions were permitted
by the Constitution, and to place its safeguards beyond the power of
any subsequent Congress to repeal. The chief purpose of this Act
was to provide federal protection for the emancipated blacks in the
exercise of certain enumerated liberties. However, it applied to all
the states, and secured protection for whites and all other races as
well. The Act provides protection for citizens (with a few designated
exceptions) "to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property. 76 Congressional sponsors of this legislation
explained that it embodied Justice Bushrod Washington's interpreta-
tion of the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, which is
discussed later in this article,77 as well as the libertarian doctrines
espoused by Blackstone and Kent.7a The relationship between this
Act and the subsequent amendment reveals that at the very least,
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
75. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. Raoul Berger refers to "the all but
universal understanding that the Amendment was to embody the Civil Rights Act." Ac-
cording to him, in the summer election campaign of 1866, the Republicans repeatedly
assured the voters that the amendment "was an embodiment of the Civil Rights Bill." R.
Berger, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 103, 115 (1977). Professor Fairman writes that in
the House debates on the amendment "[iover and over ... the correspondence between
Section 1 of the Amendment and the Civil Rights Act is noted. The provisions of the one
are treated as though they were essentially identical with those of the other." Fairman,
Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5.44
(1949). Harry Flack concludes that "the general opinion, held in the North. . .was that
the Amendment embodied the Civil Rights Bill." H. Flack, THE ADOPTION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 153 (1908). See also Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Re-
visited, The Segregation Question, 54 MICH. L. REv. 1049 (1956).
76. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
77. See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
78. See B. SIEGAN, supra note 57, at 46-56.
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section 1 protected economic and property rights.
Representative John Bingham of Ohio was the leading author of
the second sentence of section 1. It replaced an earlier version, which
he also largely authored and presented to the Congress in February,
1866, as follows:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be neccessary
and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States
equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property. 9
Bingham was a member of the committee which ordered both ver-
sions to be reported. It is useful to study this earlier version, since
Bingham (and probably the committee of which he was a member)
sought to achieve essentially the same goals in both efforts. The first
part of the original version was worded to incorporate the language
of article IV, section 2 of the Constitution, while the second part
used terminology not found elsewhere, but reflecting the due process
language in the fifth amendment. According to Bingham, the
amendment would enable Congress to apply fundamental rights con-
tained in the Constitution to the states: "Every word of the proposed
amendment is today in the Constitution of our country, save the
words conferring the express grant of power upon the Congress of
the United States."'80 The Framers had omitted inserting authority
for Congress to enforce against the states the "great canons of the
supreme law.""' The amendment would, Bingham said, arm Con-
gress "with the power to enforce the bill of rights as it stands in the
Constitution today." 2 It encompassed those safeguards guaranteed
by two of the most critical provisions of the Constitution: the privi-
leges and immunities clause of article IV, and the due process clause
of the fifth amendment,83 which together, for Bingham, included all
natural and fundamental rights.8 4
The proposed amendment, Bingham asserted, would greatly ad-
vance freedom and yet maintain the federal-state balance. "[T]he
care of the property, the liberty, and the life of the citizen . . . is in
the States, and not in the Federal Government. I have sought to ef-
fect no change in that respect in the Constitution of the country."
Under the amendment, Congress could "punish all violations by
79. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1033-34 (1866).
80. Id. at 1034.
81. Id. at 1090.
82. Id. at 1088.
83. Id. at 1088-89.
84. Id. at 1089-91.
State officers of the bill of rights, but [leave them] to discharge
[their] duties." 85
Bingham explained that the equal protection provision of the pro-
posed amendment applied the due process guarantee to the states.
He equated these two concepts; each comprehended the other. There
could be no liberty without equality, and vice versa. For Bingham,
equality before the law meant that all laws should apply equally and
that no person or group should be favored or denied. When govern-
ment limits the liberties of certain individuals, it also denies them
equality with others not so incapacitated.8
Bingham was far from alone in this thinking. For a great many
years prior to the Civil War, abolitionists had maintained that the
fifth amendment's due process clause required that the laws treat
equally with respect to life, liberty, and property all persons similarly
situated. 7 Legislation treating certain people in a different or special
way without adequate cause-therefore unequally-was found to be
violative of due process in some judicial decisions prior to the Civil
War.8 8 Subsequent to ratification of the fourteenth amendment,
courts employed the due process clause, the equal protection clause,
or both to nullify legislation arbitrarily denying liberties to individu-
als or groups. To preserve a statute under either clause, a state had
to show that sufficient reason existed to account for the different
treatment. 89
Congressional sentiment was unfavorable to Bingham's first ver-
sion, and it was not voted up or down by either House. The major
problem with this version was that instead of prohibiting state action
infringing on liberties, the amendment placed the obligation to pro-
tect liberties entirely on Congress, thus enabling future Congresses
to change policy. The final version of the fourteenth amendment was
drafted to meet this problem. Consistent with the form of other con-
stitutional protections, it prohibited state action; its purposes could
be negated not by the will of another Congress, but only by another
amendment. However, the final version empowered Congress to en-
force the amendment's provisions.9"
85. Id. at 1292.
86. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 983, 985 (1859); CONG. GLOBE, 34th
Cong., 3d Sess. App. 140 (1857).
87. J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 119-22 (1969).
88. See R. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 256-74 (1926).
89. See id. at 275-99. The similarity of the two clauses is discussed by Chief Jus-
tice Earl Warren in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
90. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. See also infra notes 96-98 and accompany-
ing text.
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B. The Framers' Intentions
To comprehend the meaning of the privileges and immunities, due
process, and equal protection clauses of section 1, consider explana-
tions the congressional leaders presented to the thirty-ninth Con-
gress, which framed the fourteenth amendment in spring of 1866. In
introducing the proposed amendment to the senate, Senator Jacob
Howard explained the privileges and immunities clause by quoting
from Justice Washington's opinion in Corfield v. Coryell,9' in which
he defined the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section
2. Although privileges and immunities cannot be fully defined in
their exact extent and precise nature, the senator observed, Wash-
ington's interpretation does give "some intimation of what probably
will be the opinion of the judiciary."92
Justice Washington was very extensive in his interpretation of the
privileges and immunities clause, as this excerpt discloses:
We feel no hesitation in confining [the constitutional provision to] those
privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which
belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at
all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose
the Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sover-
eign. What these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more te-
dious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended
under the following general heads: Protection by the government; the enjoy-
ment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of
every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject never-
theless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the
general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one state to pass
through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture,
professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas
corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the
state; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal . . ..
Senator Howard also embraced within his definition of privileges and
immunities the
personal rights guarantied [sic] and secured by the first eight amendments
of the Constitution; such as the freedom of speech and of the press; the
right of the people peacefully to assemble and petition the Government for
91. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
92. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866).
93. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52. Washington directed his remarks at the clause in
article IV, which differs from the one in the fourteenth amendment in identifying the
benefited parties. Article IV refers to "citizens of each state," while the fourteenth pro-
tects "citizens of the United States." However, Washington's definition applies to both
categories: privileges and immunities "belong, of right, to the citizens of all free govern-
ments." It would seem to be a distinction without a difference: Nonetheless, Justice
Miller in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36 (1872), used it as a basis for
his opinion in that case.
a redress of grievances, a right appertaining to each and all of the people;
the right to keep and to bear arms; the right to be exempted from the quar-
tering of soldiers in a house without the consent of the owner; the right to
be exempt from unreasonable searches and seizures, and from any search or
seizure except by virtue of a warrant issued upon a formal oath or affidavit;
the right of an accused person to be informed of the nature of the accusa-
tion against him, and his right to be tried by an impartial jury of the vici-
nage; and also the right to be secure against excessive bail and against cruel
and unusual punishments. 94
Instead of offering separate meanings for the due process and
equal protection clauses, Howard lumped them together in a short
explanation, asserting that the these clauses outlaw racial prefer-
ences and all class and caste legislation, and secure legal equality for
everyone. He subsequently went on to state that section 1 "will, if
adopted by the States, forever disable every [state] from passing
laws trenching upon those fundamental rights and privileges which
pertain to citizens of the United States, and to all persons who hap-
pen to be within their jurisdiction." 5
Howard's explanation of the meaning of section 5 of the four-
teenth amendment is also instructive on interpreting section 1. Sec-
tion 5 provides: "The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." 9 Howard de-
scribed section 5 as "a direct affirmative delegation of power to Con-
gress to carry out all the principles of all these guarantees" 97 of sec-
tion 1. Congress would have the responsibility of seeing to it "that no
State infringes the rights of persons or property."98 Here again,
Howard advised Congress that section 1 was a broad and substantive
restraint on the states.
The famous abolitionist, Representative Thadeus Stevens intro-
duced the proposed fourteenth amendment into the House of Repre-
sentatives, stating in part:
The first section prohibits the States from abridging the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States, or unlawfully depriving them of
life, liberty, or property, or of denying to any person within their jurisdic-
tion the "equal" protection of the laws.
I can hardly believe that any person can be found who will not admit that
every one of these provisions is just. They are all asserted, in some form or
other, in our Declaration or organic law. But the Constitution limits only
the action of Congress, and is not a limitation on the States. This amend-
ment supplies that defect, and allows Congress to correct the unjust legisla-
tion of the States, so far that the law which operates upon one man shall
operate equally upon all.19
Stevens went on at greater length to explain that section 1 would
94. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866).
95. Id. at 2766.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
97. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866).
98. Id. at 2768.
99. Id. at 2459.
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reduce or eliminate racial discrimination. The above quoted excerpt
reveals his meaning of the section to be consistent with that of Sena-
tor Howard, although Stevens was far less specific.
In substance, Stevens made three points: (1) Section 1 embodies
the rights specified in the Declaration of Independence ("Declara-
tion") and the Constitution ("organic law"); (2) the Constitution
does not apply these rights to the states; (3) the proposed amend-
ment remedies this "defect," and enables Congress-by way of sec-
tion 5-to apply the rights to the states.
That Stevens viewed section I as mandating federal substantive
controls over the states is evident from the foregoing excerpt, as well
as from remarks he made in relation to the first version of the sec-
tion. 00 Stevens interpreted the privileges and immunities and equal
protection clauses of that version as safeguarding the people against
unequal or discriminatory laws, whether or not they implicated
race. 10 In arguing that Congress' power under the earlier measure
was confined, Stevens asserted that it could not "interfere in any
case where the legislation of a state was equal, impartial to all.' 0 2
But Congress would have the power to correct "distinction [s] in the
same law."'' Hence, "[w]hen a distinction is made between two
married people or two femmes sole, then it is unequal legislation;
but where all of the same class are dealt with in the same way then
there is no pretense of inequality."'0 4 Therefore, according to Ste-
vens, Congress, in enforcing the proposed amendment, would con-
sider the same kind of factors that courts do in determining whether
a legislature has infringed due process or equal protection rights.
It is apparent from the explanations presented by Howard and
Stevens that the basic rationale behind all three rights clauses of
section 1 was similar: each was an extensive guarantee against the
deprivation of liberty. In fact, each of the three concepts was a catch
phrase of the antislavery movement, directed at oppressive state leg-
islation. 0 5 In the debates that followed introduction of the amend-
ment, Representative Bingham explained that section I protects "the
privileges and immunities of all of the citizens of the Republic and
the inborn rights of every person within its jurisdiction."'10 6 For Bing-
100. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
101. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).
102. See id. at 1063.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 1064.
105. B. SIEGAN, supra note 57, at 66.
106. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866).
ham, privileges and immunities encompassed all fundamental rights,
including those contained in the first eight amendments, and he used
"inborn" as a synonym for natural rights. "[C]itizens of the United
States . . . are entitled to all the privileges and immunities . . .
amongst which are the rights of life, liberty, and property, and their
due protection in the enjoyment thereof by law."'10 7 He believed that
both the due process and the equal protection clauses secured natu-
ral rights for all persons, regardless of citizenship: "That great want
of the citizen and stranger, protection by national law from unconsti-
tutional State enactments, is supplied by the first section of this
amendment."' 108
In construing a measure of Congress, the explanations of those
who introduce it to their respective Houses are of great importance,
unless floor debate provides contradictory messages. Nothing in the
Congressional debates suggests that Howard, Stevens, and Bingham
encountered opposition in their explanations that the three rights
clauses of section 1 provided extensive protection for individual liber-
ties, whether for the emancipated blacks or anyone else. Inasmuch as
the major terms were widely used during the Civil and pre-Civil
War periods to affirm individual rights, especially by the Republi-
cans, who then were in the majority in Congress, the congressmen
had at least a layman's appreciation of the wide scope of the lan-
guage in section 1.
By 1866, as a result of Dred Scott'0 9 and other decisions, the na-
tion had experienced the enormous power of the United States Su-
preme Court. One would expect that the congressmen who framed
the fourteenth amendment understood that the open language of the
rights clauses enabled a court, so disposed, to secure very broadly
individual liberties at the state level. In fact, Dred Scott interpreted
the due process clause of the fifth amendment as substantively pro-
tecting liberty and property." 0 To no avail, Democrats opposing the
fourteenth amendment warned of its broadness and the great threat
this created for state autonomy. Surely, if the amendment, as some
commentators insist, was confined almost entirely to the subject of
race, the very extensive protections-privileges and immunities, due
process of law, and equal protection of laws-accorded both "citi-
zens" and "persons" would not have been necessary or appropriate.
Congress wrote the first sentence of section 1 specifically to re-
verse a major part of the Dred Scott decision, that blacks were not
citizens of the United States. This sentence provides: "All persons
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
107. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong. 2d Sess. 984 (1859).
108. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2543 (1866).
109. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
110. See infra text accompanying notes 172, 173.
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tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside.""" However, though the nation was still reeling
from the Dred Scott decision, the thirty-ninth Congress did not limit
the power of the Supreme Court. It may be true that the Framers of
1787 did not appreciate the potential power of the Supreme Court;
clearly that was not the situation for the Framers of 1866.
Stevens was chairman, and Howard and Bingham were members
of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction of the thirty-ninth Con-
gress-known as the "Committee of Fifteen"-which originated
both the original and final versions of the rights sentence of section
1. The Committee consisted of nine representatives and six senators,
and considered various constitutional options relating to reconstruc-
tion. It voted to report favorably the proposed fourteenth amendment
containing the final version of the rights sentence of section 1. The
vote was twelve Republicans for, and three Democrats against. None
of the other Republican members of this committee challenged or
questioned the explanations of Section 1 presented by Howard, Ste-
vens, and Bingham. Surely, the members of the Committee who pre-
sumably gave considerable thought to the matter must have under-
stood reasonably well the extensive language they approved in the
rights sentence.'
IV. DUE PROCESS
The admonition that a person shall not be deprived of "life, liberty
or property without due process of law" appears in both the fifth and
fourteenth amendments, and has been a major factor in constitu-
tional jurisprudence in this century. Applied substantively to strike
down federal and state laws, the due process clauses were the source
of protection for economic liberties early in the century, and for
abortion rights later on. We know little about what the first Con-
gress, the Framers of the fifth amendment, meant by due process.
But as previously indicated, much was said about the concept in the
thirty-ninth Congress that authored the fourteenth amendment. The
more important question is what the legal meaning was at the time
of each framing.
111. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 165-71 regarding the meaning of due pro-
cess for the public prior to the framing of the fourteenth amendment.
A. The Fifth Amendment
At least three separate meanings may be accorded the fifth
amendment's due process clause:
1. It mandates that the federal judiciary give proper and fair pro-
cess to persons prosecuted or sued for wrongdoing before the imposi-
tion of any penalty depriving them of life, liberty or property.
2. In addition to protecting judicial process, it also secures persons
from being arbitrarily deprived by Congress or a federal agency of
life, liberty or property. Hence, the due process provision requires
the federal judiciary to monitor the content of federal legislation or
regulation for this purpose.
3. It forbids the federal government from depriving any person of
life, liberty or property except as a sanction for committing ordinary
criminal wrongdoing. This interpretation divides the clause into two
parts: deprivation (no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property) and due process (without due process of law). For the pro-
tected area, Congress is limited to enacting a criminal code and po-
lice-power measures to which all provisions of the Constitution are
subject. "Deprive" does not include imposition of taxes, civil law
penalties or compensated eminent domain acquisitions. Only the ju-
diciary may impose penalties, and then, strictly pursuant to proper
and fair processes.
Judge Bork subscribes to the first meaning, rejecting any substan-
tive role for the clause. He holds the same position about the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.1 13 In my view, either
definition number two or three correctly presents the original mean-
ing; the evidence is not sufficiently clear to me to allow for a more
specific answer. What is plain, however, is the existence of strong
historical support that the clause originally provided for both proce-
dural and substantive safeguards, as the subsequent discussion will
explain. In short, the due process clauses protect a person against
government oppression.
The due process concept originated in Chapter 39 of the Magna
Charta, which was obtained by threat of force from King John at
Runnymede in 1215. This chapter provides in essence that no free-
man shall be arrested, or detained in prison, or deprived of his free-
hold, or outlawed, or banished, or in any way molested unless by the
lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land." 4 "A King
113. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 31, 60.
114. Translations of the original, which was in Latin, differ. Justice Bradley trans-
lated the chapter as follows:
No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold or
liberties or free customs, or be outlawed or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed;
nor will we pass upon him or condemn him but by lawful judgment of his peers
or by the law of the land.
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had been brought to order . . . by the community of the land under
baronial leadership; a tyrant had been subjected to the laws which
hitherto it had been his private privilege to administer and modify at
will."'15 The king's legislative powers were also limited, for "if by
'law of the land' was meant any law which the king might enact, the
provision was a nullity."116
The Magna Charta was corroborated by thirty-two statutes and
its principles confirmed by many others. It achieved an exalted sta-
tus in English law. Parliament adopted it and made it part of the
common law. All statutes contrary to the charter were declared void,
and its liberties were proclaimed to be the birthright of the people of
England. In a 1354 statute, due process language was'substituted for
both "judgment of his peers" and "law of the land": "No man of
what state or condition he be, shall be put out of his lands or tena-
ments, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to death,
without he be brought to answer by due process of law.""' 7 In time,
"due process of law" became synonymous with "the law of the
land," and the two terms have been used interchangeably in state
bills of rights.
Blackstone and Coke interpreted Chapter 39 and its successors as
protective of human rights. Blackstone stated that this Chapter
"alone would have merited the title that it [the Magna Charta]
bears, of the great charter."""8 He construed the chapter as protect-
ing "every individual of the nation in the free enjoyment of his life,
his liberty, and his property, unless declared to be forfeited by the
judgment of his peers or the law of the land.""19 Parliament and the
judiciary expanded the meaning of these protections greatly over the
years. For his time, Blackstone considered the rights of life, liberty
and property to be comprehended in the "absolute rights of personal
security, personal liberty, and private property." 20
So long as these [rights] remain inviolate, the subject is perfectly free; for
every species of compulsive tyranny must act in opposition to one or other
of these rights, having no other object upon which it can possibly be em-
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 114-15 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
115. G. TREVELYAN, A SHORTENED HISTORY OF ENGLAND 132 (1942).
116. Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 433 (1856) (Selden, J.).
117. 28 Edw. III, C.3 (1354). The change also imposed a judicial role in enforcing
the guarantee.
118. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *417.
119. Id.
120. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *119-41. Absolute rights could not be
controlled or limited except by the law of the land. See supra notes 24-26 and accompa-
nying text.
ployed. To preserve these from violation, it is necessary that the constitution
of parliaments be supported in its full vigor; and limits certainly known, be
set to the royal prerogative. . . . And all these rights and liberties it is our
birthright to enjoy entire; unless where the laws of our country have laid
them under necessary restraints.
Blackstone condemned laws as destructive of freedom that were
wanton and causeless restraints, "whether practiced by a monarch, a
nobility, or a popular assembly."12 2 "[Tjhat system of laws, is alone
calculated to maintain civil liberty, which leaves the subject entire
master of his own conduct, except in those points wherein the public
good requires some direction or restraint."' 12 3
Thus, paraphrasing Blackstone, the objective of Chapter 39 and
its successors was to prohibit rulers or ruling bodies from arbitrarily
depriving people of their life, liberty, or property. Procedural guar-
antees can only partially satisfy this goal. There must also be sub-
stantive protection; the fact that a law was passed under all the for-
malities does not make it a necessary one.
That Blackstone regarded Chapter 39 and its successors as secur-
ing substantive rights (in addition to procedural ones) is further evi-
dent from his discussion of the right of property. For him, the prop-
erty right "consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all
.. . acquisitions, without any control or dimunition, save only by the
laws of the land." 12 4 Declaring that the laws of the land are "ex-
tremely watchful in ascertaining and protecting this right," 125 he
goes on to explain that Parliament enacted statutes "that no man
shall be disinherited, nor put out of his franchises or freehold, unless
he be duly brought to answer, and be forejudged by course of law;
and if anything be done to the contrary, it shall be redressed, and
holden for none. '12 6 Thus, property owners were safeguarded against
confiscation, except in the form of a penalty for wrongdoing as deter-
mined under the existing law.
The law of the land protected an owner when government invoked
eminent domain powers. Only the legislature could acquire property;
it could not do so, however, "by absolutely stripping the subject of
his property in an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full indem-
nification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained." This is
but one instance "in which the law of the land has postponed even
public necessity to the sacred and inviolable rights of private prop-
erty. '1 27 Although the power of Parliament is absolute, Blackstone
121. Id. at *140.
122. Id. at *122.
123. Id.
124. Id. at *134.
125. Id.
126. Id. at *134-35.
127. Id. at *135.
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reveals that it was as a practical matter still subject to observing the
rights of the people that were protected under the common law.
Sir Edward Coke similarly construed the law of the land as secur-
ing both procedural and substantive rights. Adoption of a lawor reg-
ulation by a governmental authority does not necessarily make it the
law of the land. Coke illustrates this point with examples. Explaining
the prohibition against disseisin of property in his Institutes,2 " Coke
referred to two cases: the first concerned a custom in a town that
enabled the lord to occupy the freehold of his tenant upon an arrear-
age in rent, and the other involved a charter granted by the king
allowing a corporation to confiscate cloth dyed with "logwood." No
judicial process was required in either prior to executing the claimed
power. Each claim of power was adjudged "against the law of the
land.",129
Coke also wrote that the prohibition against being disseised re-
quired that "no man ought to be put from his livelihood without an-
swer," 13 0 meaning without proper judicial process. Discussing protec-
tion for "liberties" (as provided for under a subsequent issue of the
charter), he asserted that
[I]f a grant be made to any man, to have the sole making of cards, or the
sole dealing with any other trade, that grant is against the liberty and free-
dom of the subject, that before did, or lawfully might have used that trade,
and consequently against this great charter.
Generally all monopolies are against this great charter, because they are
against the liberty and freedom of the subject, and against the law of the
land.'
"Liberties" included other economic activities. An ordinance by a
company of merchant tailors "having power by their charter to make
ordinances" restricted the sellers from whom members could buy
their clothes. This ordinance was adjudged to violate the law "be-
cause it was against the liberty of the subject, for every subject [has]
freedom to put his clothes to be dressed by whom he will. '1 32
Forfeiture of a protected interest could come about only when its
possessor is "brought in to answer . . . by due process of the com-
128. 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 46 (1817); see also supra
notes 22-23 and accompanying text; Carpenter, Substantive Due Process at Issue: A
Resume, 5 UCLA L. REV. 47, 50-57 (1958); Wagner, Coke and the Rise of Economic
Liberalism, 6 ECON. HIsT. REv. 30 (1935).
129. 1 E. COKE, supra note 128, at 46.
130. Id. at 47.
131. Id.
132. Id.
mon law."'1a Coke explains "process of the law" as including "by
indictment or presentment of good and lawful men, where such
deeds be done in due manner, or by writ original of the common
law."'134 These were the procedures that had to be observed before
interests protected by the charter, as subsequently reissued or sup-
plemented, could be diminished. Hence, the abridgement by the king
or other governmental authorities (except probably Parliament, as I
have explained" 6 ) of life, liberty, or property without the person be-
ing "brought in to answer" violated due process of law. Thus, per-
sons who abided by the existing laws were safe in their persons and
possessions from harm by the king and those claiming under him.
As I have previously indicated, it is most likely that the common
law interpretations of Coke and Blackstone were known and ac-
cepted by the legal community in late eighteenth century America
when the Bill of Rights was framed. 36 Given this background, it is
most difficult to conclude that its framers considered the due process
provision as confined to procedural protection.
As Bork's The Tempting of America shows, most American
judges have in the past and present accepted substantive due pro-
cess.' 37 This should not be surprising, for reasons I have presented.
Moreover, the idea that the due process concept can be limited to
procedure is fanciful; the distinction between procedural and sub-
stantive due process has little basis in principle. Consider this analy-
sis. Due process requires that no person be punished for wrongdoing
without judicial observance of all procedural safeguards required by
the Constitution. If the legislature eliminates any one of these safe-
guards, it violates due process for the persons affected: Suppose how-
ever, the legislature, as part of a regulatory program, makes it a
crime for the same persons to engage in particular commercial activ-
ity. In this situation, a person's liberty to pursue certain commerce
has been divested without exhaustion of any procedural guarantees.
(The fact that a judicial proceeding is required to execute the pen-
alty does not change the law's basic impact.) Judges who likened
such deprivation of liberty to a penalty would necessarily find the
law beyond the legislative power. Consider Chancellor Kent's obser-
vations in this regard:
133. Id. at 50.
134. Id.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 20-26. Coke's views were generally ac-
ceptable to Blackstone. "[H]is [Coke's] influence, as the embodiment of the common
law, was so strong that it is useless to contend that he 'was either misled by his sources or
consciously misinterpreted them' for Coke's mistakes, it is said, are the common law."
Brockelbank, The Role of Due Process in American Constitutional Law, 39 CORNELL
L.Q. 561, 562 (1954).
137. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 1-141.
[VOL. 27: 309. 1990] People's Liberties
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
[T]here is no distinction in principle, nor any recognized in practice, be-
tween a law punishing a person criminally, for a past innocent act, or pun-
ishing him civilly by devesting him of a lawfully acquired right. The distinc-
tion consists only in the degree of the oppression, and history teaches us
that the government which can deliberately violate the one right, soon
ceases to regard the other. 138
The reason the due process clause was included in the Bill of
Rights has been a matter of some conjecture. One may assume that
its meaning in the late eighteenth century comprehended the full roll
of procedural guarantees then thought essential in criminal and civil
trials. Since the original Constitution and Bill of Rights both pro-
vided these protections, the due process clause was to this extent su-
perfluous. The same is not true with respect to substantive protec-
tion. Some of the liberties Blackstone and Coke considered as
safeguarded under Magna Charta and subsequent English law are
not specifically secured in either the Constitution or Bill of Rights,
such as the right of reputation and to engage freely in economic ac-
tivity. 139 The clause remedies this deficiency. It also provides the
Constitution with a great historic symbol against oppression. Its
presence made clear Congress could not at its will deprive people of
those rights that were of greatest concern in the English speaking
world.
The eminent domain (or taking) clause "0 follows the due process
clause in the fifth amendment, and this may not be a matter of
chance. If the due process clause is of broad substantive character,
the taking clause was necessary to preserve the eminent domain
power. Together, they may be interpreted as barring the federal gov-
ernment from limiting a person's possession of life, liberty and prop-
erty, except (1) for wrongdoing, or (2) when the property is taken
for public use, upon payment of just compensation. This may be an-
other explanation for the inclusion of the taking clause in the Bill of
Rights, since many state bills then omitted such.a provision.
Substantive due process was accepted by a number of high courts
in the nation's early history. As might be expected from the previous
discussion, these decisions waivered between construing law of the
138. Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 506 (N.Y. 1811). This case involved retro-
spective legislation, and did not relate directly to due process of law.
139. Among the specific rights Blackstone referred to and not included in the Con-
stitution and Bill of Rights were those protecting people from slander of reputation and
banishment or exile, 1 W. BLACKSTONE, surpa note 24, at *130, 133, while Coke as-
serted, as we have seen, that many economic liberties were secured. See supra notes 128-
132 and accompanying text.
140. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V ("[n]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
land and due process clauses as partially or totally protective in
scope. The first time the United States Supreme Court considered
the meaning of "law of the land" was in 1819, when Justice Johnson
in Bank of Columbia v. Okely interpreted the law of the land clause
of the Maryland Constitution as "intended to secure the individual
from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unre-
strained by the established principles of private rights and distribu-
tive justice."'' Thus, "law of the land" provided partial substantive
protection. On the other hand, the North Carolina Supreme Court
held in 1805, in University of North Carolina v. Foy and Bishop,142
that the law of the land clause in the state constitution totally se-
cured the right of property and prohibited the legislature from re-
pealing a prior grant of lands to a university:
The property vested in the Trustees must remain for uses intended for the
University, until the Judiciary of the country in the usual and common
form, pronounce them guilty of such acts, as will, in law, amount to a for-
feiture of their rights or a dissolution of their body.1 43
Regardless of the merits, the legislature could not deprive a legal
entity of its property. In 1792, the South Carolina Supreme Court
decided that an act of the colonial assembly transfering a freehold
from one person to another without any compensation or jury trial
was invalid, being "against common right, as well as against Magna
Charta."'"
In the often cited case of Gardner v. Village of Newburgh
(1816), 4  Chancellor Kent found that a right to a stream of water
"is as sacred as a right to the soil over which it flows.' 146 It was,
therefore, "part of the freehold, of which no man can be disseised
'but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by due process of law.' This
is an ancient and fundamental maxim of common right to be found
in Magna Charta.' ' 47 Kent held in essence that the fundamental
right to due process of law would be violated if the owner of the land
through which the stream flowed was not compensated for the loss
he suffered if the flow was diverted by the city.
In the North Carolina decision of Hoke v. Henderson (1833),'1 8
another much cited case, Chief Justice Ruffin of the North Carolina
high court reasons similarly, asserting that a legitimate vesting of
the property right could not be upset except on account of the
owner's subsequent wrongdoing. According to him, the term "law of
141. Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819).
142. 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 53 (1805).
143. Foy, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) at 79.
144. Bowman v. Middleton, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 252 (1792).
145. 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. ch. 1816).
146. Id. at 166.
147. Id.
148. 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1 (1833).
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the land" requires that before anyone is deprived of property, he
shall have a judicial trial according to the common law, "and a deci-
sion on the matter of right, as determined by the law under which
[the property] vested." 149 This case involved a statute, which in pro-
viding for the future election of court clerks, caused some appointed
clerks to lose their employment. The property rights in question were
those of the incumbent clerks to their positions.
A number of New York opinions subscribed generally to Hoke's
rationale, culminating in the famous case of Wynehamer v. People
(1856),15o involving a state penal statute that forbade the sale of in-
toxicating liquors owned at the time of enactment (except those for
medicinal and religious purposes), and that required the destruction
of those intended for sale. Wynehamer held that the statute violated
the state constitution's due process clause, which protected the pre-
rogatives of ownership. While some regulation is possible, wrote Jus-
tice Comstock,
where [property] rights are acquired by the citizen under the existing law,
there is no power in any branch of the government to take them away; but
where they are held contrary to the existing law, or are forfeited by its
violation, then they may be taken from him-not by an act of the legisla-
ture, but in the due administration of the law itself, before the judicial
tribunals of the state. The cause or occasion for depriving the citizen of his
supposed rights must be found in the law as it is, or, at least it cannot be
created by a legislative act which aims at their destruction. Where rights of
property are admitted to exist, the legislature cannot say they shall exist no
longer; nor will it make any difference, although a process and a tribunal
are appointed to execute the sentence. If this is the "law of the land," and
"due process of law," within the meaning of the constitution, then the legis-
lature is omnipotent. It may, under the same interpretation, pass a law to
take away liberty or life without a preexisting cause, appointing judicial
and executive agencies to execute its will.161
149. Id. at 14.
150. 13 N.Y. 378 (1856). This decision was not followed in other states, probably
for the most part because of the sensitivity of the liquor issue. For a survey of pre-
fourteenth amendment cases involving due process or law of the land provisions, see B.
SIEGAN, supra note 1, at 24-46; R. Morr, supra note 88, at 256-99.
151. Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 393.
[B]oth courts and commentators in this country have held that these clauses
[law of the land and due process], in either form, secure to every citizen a
judicial trial, before he can be deprived of life, liberty or property . . . . It
follows, that a law which should provide in regard to any article in which the
right of property is recognized, that it should neither be sold or used, nor kept
in any place whatsoever within this state, would fall directly within the letter of
the constitutional inhibition; as it would in the most effectual manner possible
deprive the owner of his property, without the interposition of any court or the
use of any process whatever.
Id. at 433-34 (citations omitted).
For Justice Comstock, New York's due process clause forbids the
legislature from depriving a law-abiding person of life, liberty or
property. He makes no exception for a regulation enacted by the leg-
islature to further the public interest. Presumably, the police powers
would be available to preserve the security of the state and safety of
its inhabitants.
Due process jurisprudence has been criticized on the basis that it
has protected unenumerated rights. Hence, while originally the term
"liberty" may have related only to personal confinement, it has been
interpreted over the years to protect other natural and fundamental
liberties. However, much of what has occurred in the interpretation
of the words "life, liberty and property" does not essentially differ
from the course taken by the judiciary concerning other guarantees
in the Bill of Rights, a good deal of which has been generally
accepted.' 52
As previously noted, before the American Constitution, the Eng-
lish Parliament and judges continually expanded the people's liber-
ties. By the time of Blackstone, the limited rights originally secured
in the Magna Charta had become very far reaching; "[s]o long as
these remain inviolate," wrote Blackstone, "the subject is perfectly
free."'153
The Constitution's Framers accepted the common law system that
encompasses continually changing meanings adapted to new under-
standings and conditions. Judge Bork tells us that "'[j]udges must
never hesitate to apply old values to new circumstances, whether
those circumstances spring from changes in technology or changes in
the impact of traditional common law actions.'"'5" "To say that
such adjustments must be left to the legislature is to say that
changes in circumstances must be permitted gradually to render con-
stitutional guarantees meaningless."'1 55 In an opinion he wrote as a
circuit court judge, Bork applied his views quite strongly to support
change in the then existing press-reputation balance by augmenting
the rights of the press and reducing the rights of persons who con-
tend they have been defamed by it.156 He denies, however, that these
principles support the legitimacy of substantive due process."5 7 Un-
152. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Justice Douglas cites many
examples of rights specifically protected in the Constitution being interpreted to include
rights that are not named but have comparable objectives.
153. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *140.
154. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 169 (quoting Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995-
96 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., concurring)).
155. Id. at 168. "It is the task of the judge in this generation to discern how the
framers' values, defined in the context of the world they knew, apply to the world we
know." Id. at 167-68. Such a test endows judges with vast powers.
156. Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 993 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane) (Bork, J. concur-
ring), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1984).
157. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 169.
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derstandably, many judges over the years operating under similar
assumptions have expanded the guarantees of the due process clauses
to secure people from various oppressions of the state. Given that (1)
English speaking law assumes reasoning by analogy, and (2) the law
rejects distinctions without meaningful differences, rules intended
basically to protect liberty are not likely to be artificially confined,
when to do so supports oppression."5 8 Nevertheless, while judicial
discretion is considerable under the due process clauses, it is still
limited as will be explained subsequently in the section on judicial
excesses.
B. The Fourteenth Amendment
While not referred to as much as privileges and immunities, due
process was the subject of considerable comment in the thirty-ninth
Congress. When mentioned, it was always in the context of limiting
governmental authority. As we have seen, this perspective was
shared by Representative Bingham," 9 whose views on the subject
are important in defining section 1, of which he was the leading au-
thor. He equated due process with equal protection and fundamental
and natural rights. No representative disputed Bingham's explana-
tion that the equal protection provision of his first version of section
1, which was clearly substantive in character, did no more than ap-
ply the due process clause to the states.
Justice Hugo Black dubbed Bingham "the Madison of the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 60 Regarded as authoritative
on the subject, Bingham spoke in Congress about the Constitution
and its protection of liberty. He was a moderate in his party, far less
radical than, for example, either Howard or Stevens. Unlike most of
his Republican colleagues, he opposed the Civil Rights Act of 1866
on constitutional grounds. However, his meanings of privileges and
immunities, due process, and equal protection were generally consis-
158. Sir James Mackintosh ascribes the principle of development of the common
law to the interpretation of the Magna Carta.
It was a peculiar advantage that the consequences of its principles were, if we
may so speak, only discovered slowly and gradually. It gave out in each occa-
sion only so much of the spirit of liberty and reformation as the circumstances
of succeeding generations required and as their character would safely bear.
For almost five centuries it was appealed to as the decisive authority on behalf
of the people, though commonly so far only as the necessities of each case
demanded.
1 J. MACKINTOSH, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 221 (1830).
159. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
160. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
tent with abolitionist positions, and therefore, consistent with those
of most members of the Republican Party, who were abolitionists or
their supporters. Abolitionist philosophy was generally libertarian,
particularly in its antagonism to state powers. The legal authorities
most quoted by far in Congress in the debates on the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 and the fourteenth amendment were Blackstone and
Kent, both of whom were strong supporters of individual liberty. The
thirty-ninth Congress was hardly dedicated to exalting the will of the
majority.
According to Bingham, the due process guarantee of the fifth
amendment secures the natural rights of life, liberty, and property
for all persons, and these rights may be extinguished only as punish-
ment for wrongdoing.
[N]atural or inherent rights, which belong to all men irrespective of all
conventional regulations, are by this constitution guarantied [sic] by the
broad and comprehensive word "person," as contradistinguished from the
limited term citizen-as the fifth article of amendments, guarding those sa-
cred rights which are as universal and indestructible as the human race,
that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property but by due
process of law, nor shall property be taken without just compensation.'"18 1
Who . . .will be bold enough to deny that all persons are equally entitled
to the enjoyment of the rights of life and liberty and property; and that no
one should be deprived of life or liberty, but as punishment for crime; nor of
his property, against his consent and without due compensation? "2
It must be apparent that the absolute equality of all, and the equal protec-
tion of each, are principles of our Constitution, which ought to be observed
and enforced in the organization and admission of new States. The Consti-
tution provides, as we have seen, that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. It makes no distinction
either on account of complexion or birth-it secures these rights to all per-
sons within its exclusive jurisdiction. This is equality. It protects not only
life and liberty, but also property, the product of labor. It contemplates that
no man shall be wrongfully deprived of the fruit of his toil any more than of
his life.1 3
Representatives, to you I appeal, that hereafter, by your act and the ap-
proval of the loyal people of this country, every man in every State of the
Union, in accordance with the written words of your Constitution, may, by
the national law, be secured in the equal protection of his personal rights.
Your Constitution provides that no man, no matter what his color, no mat-
ter beneath what sky he may have been born, no matter in what disastrous
conflict or by what tyrannical hand his liberty may have been cloven down,
no matter how poor, no matter how friendless, no matter how ignorant,
shall be deprived of life or liberty or property without due process of
law-law in its highest sense, that law which is the perfection of human
reason, and which is impartial, equal, exact justice; that justice which re-
quires that every man shall have his right; that justice which is the highest
duty of nations as it is the imperishable attribute of the God of nations. 6,
For Bingham, the concept of due process under the fifth amend-
161. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 (1859).
162. Id. at 985.
163. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong. 3d Sess. App. 140 (1857).
164. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1094 (1866).
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ment was a strong weapon against all forms of government oppres-
sion, a view which I did not find challenged in the Congressional
debates. 1 5 Interestingly, Representative Wilson, chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee, and floor chairman for the proposed
Civil Rights Act of 1866, went so far as to assert that the Act ap-
plied the substantive protections of the fifth amendment's due pro-
cess clause to oppressive legislation in the states.1 6 The clause, of
course, impacted only the federal government; Wilson's observation
is further revealing of the opinion held by some political leaders on
the scope of the guarantee.
"Due process" was an often-used term before, during, and after
the Civil War. Both sides of the slavery controversy employed it to
further their own causes. Proslavery forces contended that slaves
were property, and therefore, owners were protected against loss
without due process. In contrast, beginning in the mid-1830s, anti-
slavery activists thought of the due process guarantee as "constitu-
tionalizing" their natural rights beliefs in the sanctity of life, liberty,
and property. They repudiated any notion that a person could be
someone else's property; people possessed property in their own
selves, and the due process clause obligated the national government
to secure it in the territories.
The due process concept was a major verbal weapon for the aboli-
tionists. The respected fourteenth amendment scholar, Howard Jay
Graham, observed that due process
was snatched up, bandied about, 'corrupted and corroded,' if you please, for
more than thirty years prior to 1866. For every black letter usage in court
there were perhaps hundreds or thousands in the press, red schoolhouse and
on the stump. Zealots, reformers, and politicians-not jurists-blazed the
paths of substantive due process.
1 7
Thus, the political parties committed to eradicating slavery used
the term "due process" to advance this position. In 1843, the Liberty
Party platform declared that the fifth amendment's due process
165. For a summary from different perspectives of the congressional debates relat-
ing to section 1, see Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History" and the Constitu-
tional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954); Fairman, Does the
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949).
166. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1294 (1866).
167. H. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION 250 (1968). "Over the next thirty
years [from 1834], due process as a substantive conception became part of the constitu-
tional stock in trade of abolitionism." J. TENBROEK, supra note 87, at 121. "In compari-
son with the concept of equal protection of the laws, the due process clause was of sec-
ondary importance to the abolitionists. It did, however, reach a full development and, by
virtue of its emphasis in the party platforms, a widespread usage and popular under-
standing." Id. at 119-20.
clause legally secured the inalienable rights referred to in the Decla-
ration.1"8 The 1848 and 1852 platforms of the Free Soil Party con-
tended that the clause served both as a restraint on the federal gov-
ernment, and as an obligation on the government to enforce the
inalienable rights set forth in the Declaration of Independence.'
More significantly, according to the 1856 and 1860 platforms of the
Republican party, the clause denied Congress the power to allow
slavery to exist in any territory in the Union: "[I]t becomes our duty
[by legislation whenever necessary] to maintain [the due process
provision] against all attempts to violate it . . . .",o In the 1856
political campaign, "due process of law" was a leading catch phrase
of Republican orators.' 7 ' This Republican affinity for due process is
important in understanding its constitutional meaning. Some of those
involved in the drafting or consideration of the Republican platforms
would probably later, as members of Congress or in other political
roles, be responsible for framing or ratifying the fourteenth
amendment.
The nation's high court mirrored the public view of due process.
In 1857, Chief Justice Taney invoked substantive due process as one
basis for his decision in the Dred Scott case. Taney held that Con-
gress had no power to prohibit slavery in specified areas because the
"powers over person and property . . . are not only not granted to
Congress, but are in express terms denied, and they are forbidden to
exercise them.' ' 172 Taney explained this "express" limitation as
follows:
And an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his
liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his property
into a particular Territory of the United States, and who has committed no
offence against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due
process of law.' 7'
Only two justices went along with Taney's general line of reason-
ing. However, by the time the fourteenth amendment was framed
168. J. TENBROEK, supra note 87, at 139. The Liberty Party was formed in 1840
and dedicated to antislavery. In 1844, its presidential candidate received 60,000 votes. It
continued strong in local elections in 1846, but united in 1848 with the antislavery Whigs
and Democrats to form the Free-Soil Party. THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 1212
(1963).
169. J. TENBROEK, supra note 87, at 140-41 nn.3 & 4. This party came into exis-
tence during 1847-48 and polled 300,000 votes. Its 1852 candidate for president received
over 150,000 votes. It was absorbed into the new Republican Party in 1854. THE COLUM-
BIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 168, at 767. Consistent with many interpretations of the
Magna Charta, the 1852 platform asserted that no man can be deprived of inalienable
rights "by valid legislation except for crime." See supra text accompanying notes 141-
151.
170. J. TENBROEK, supra note 87, at 141 nn.5 & 6.
171. H. GRAHAM, supra note 167, at 80.
172. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 450 (1857).
173. Id.
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and ratified in 1866, substantive due process was a viable concept
among the Justices. In a federal circuit court case in 1865, Supreme
Court Justice Grier held that a Pennsylvania statute repealing a rail-
road corporation charter violated the due course of law provision of
the state constitution.' 74 The first High Court interpretation of due
process after framing of the fourteenth amendment was Hepburn v.
Griswold (1870)175 which concerned in part the due process clause
of the fifth amendment. When the Hepburn decision was rendered
on February 7, 1870, the Court consisted of only seven members.
For the majority of four, Chief Justice Chase held (among other is-
sues) that holders of promissory contracts entered into prior to the
effective date of the Legal Tender Act of 1862 were deprived by that
Act of the right to receive payment in gold or silver coin in violation
of the fifth amendment's due process guarantee. Justice Grier was
then no longer a member of the Court, but he had been when the
case was decided in conference on November 27, 1869, at which
time he concurred with the majority.176 Except for Grier, no change
had occurred on the court since 1862.
The majority assumed that the fifth amendment's due process
clause secures owners of real estate, and concluded that it protects
holders of contracts to the same extent. According to Chase, the
clause (as well as other provisions of the fifth amendment) operates
"directly in limitation and restraint of the legislative powers con-
ferred by the Constitution."' 171 Justice Miller, for the minority of
three, did not deny that the clause was a substantive limitation on
the legislature. He objected that the effect on holders of contracts
was incidental to the purpose of Congress to further the war effort.
President Grant subsequently appointed two justices, who on May 1,
1871 in the Knox v. Lee, 78 joined with the three dissenters to re-
verse Hepburn. Writing for the majority, Justice Strong applied the
same analysis to the due process issue as Miller had in Hepburn, and
Chase, now in the minority, followed his prior interpretation.
One of the dissenting Justices in Hepburn was Swayne, and he
and newly appointed Justice Bradley voted with the majority in
Knox. Neither should be considered antagonistic to substantive due
process. On the contrary, both contended in their dissents in the
174. See Baltimore v. Pittsburgh & C.R. Co., 2 F. Cas. 570, (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1865)
(No. 827).
175. 75 U.S. 603 (1870).
176. Id. at 626.
177. Id. at 624.
178. 79 U.S. 457 (1871).
Slaughter-House Cases,1 9 which was decided the following year,
that the fourteenth amendment's due process clause secured property
and economic interests. On the issue of protecting vested property
interests, these two Justices would probably have agreed with the
four who had made up the majority in Hepburn. In Knox, Bradley
filed a concurring opinion, arguing that Congress had full power to
enact the disputed legislation. He did not discuss due process di-
rectly. Presumably, Swayne agreed, although he did not file a sepa-
rate opinion in either case.
As reported in the last section, prior to the Civil War, some state
high courts applied due.process substantively to strike down legisla-
tion."' 0 Rejecting complaints that they were making law, the judges
maintained they were protecting liberty under their constitutions.
Accordingly, New York Supreme Court Justice Bronson asserted
that the words "'by law of the land' [or by due process of law] do
not mean a statute passed for the purpose of working the wrong.
That construction would render the restriction absolutely nugatory
and turn this part of the Constitution into mere nonsense . . . . [For
it would mean], '[y]ou shall not do the wrong, unless you choose to
do it.' "181
In the first edition of his famous treatise on constitutional limita-
tions, published in 1868, Justice Thomas Cooley concluded that gov-
ernment can violate due process by the limitations it imposes,
and not [by] any considerations of mere form. . . . When the government,
through its established agencies, interferes with the title to one's property,
or with his independent enjoyment of it, and its act is called in question as
not in accordance with the law of the land, we are to test its validity by
those principles of civil liberty and constitutional defence which have be-
come established in our system of law, and not by any rules that pertain to
forms of procedure merely . . . . Due process of law in each particular case
means, such an exertion of powers of government as the settled maxims of
law sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of individual
rights as those maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the one in
question belongs. 82
Cooley conceded that private rights to property may be interfered
with by any branch of government without violating due process:
The chief restriction is that vested rights must not be disturbed; but in its
application as a shield of protection, the term "vested rights" is not used in
any narrow or technical sense, as importing a power of legal control merely,
179. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 124 (1872) (Swayne, J., dissenting); id. at II1 (Brad-
ley, J., dissenting).
180. In re Dorsey, 7 Port. 293 (Ala. 1838); Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378
(1856); Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N.Y. 202 (1854); Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140 (N.Y.
1843); Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1 (1833); Allen v. Peden, 4 N.C. (Taylor)
442 (1816).
181. Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140, 145-46 (N.Y. 1843). "[Wlhen one man wants
the property of another, I mean to say that the Legislature cannot aid him in making the
acquisition." Id. at 147.
182. T. COOLEY, supra note 35, at 356.
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but rather as implying a vested interest which it is equitable the govern-
ment should recognize, and of which the individual cannot be deprived
without injustice.18
He went on to discuss those property interests protected by due pro-
cess clauses (or their equivalent, law of the land). Thus, according to
this highly authoritative commentator, due process at the time the
fourteenth amendment came into being provided substantive safe-
guards for property interests. Cooley rejected the view that due pro-
cess had no more than procedural significance in civil matters. As
previously indicated, this position was probably accepted at that time
by a majority of the United States Supreme Court.
V. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Judge Bork rejects the interpretation that the ninth .mendment
(or any other constitutional provision) protects unenume ated rights.
He objects that such an interpretation gives great discretion to the
judiciary to restrain democratic rule. Had the Framers contemplated
this vast mandate to the Justices, they would have provided for it
specifically in the ninth amendment, with language like, "The courts
shall determine what rights, in addition to those enumerated here,
are retained by the people," or "The American people, believing in a
law of nature and a law of nature's God, delegate to their courts the
task of determining what rights, other than those enumerated here,
are retained by the people."' 84
Bork's premise is incorrect. The Constitution did not establish ma-
jority rule; it created a unique system wherein individual liberty
often is immune from majority will. Either of Bork's proposed provi-
sions is not only unnecessary, for the reasons previously noted in the
section on the Bill of Rights, but also would not be in keeping with
the character of our very brief Constitution. The original document,
together with its twenty-six amendments, takes up no more than fif-
teen book-size pages. The language is very concise and often not very
informative. The 1787 text does not disclose that the judiciary has
the power to protect natural rights, yet it does. The document no-
where provides for judicial review of federal legislation-a most im-
portant judicial power, and one of the most critical in the entire
Constitution. Not until Marbury v. Madison,'85 decided, fifteen
years after ratification, did the Supreme Court uphold the right of
183. Id. at 357-58.
184. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 183.
185. 5 U.S..(1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
349
the judiciary to invalidate congressional enactments. Nor does the
Constitution anywhere refer to the eminent domain or police powers
of government: the nation has always assumed the existence of these
two critical powers, although the Constitution does not specifically
authorize them.
The Constitution is often not very informative about subjects that
it does mention. Perhaps the most important clause of article I, sec-
tion 8, which enumerates the powers of Congress, is clause 18, giving
Congress power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all
other Powers vested by this constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."186 This lan-
guage is not very precise, and it accords great discretion to an inter-
preter. According to Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, the
clause restrained the Congress to use only those means absolutely or
indispensably necessary to implement an enumerated power.1 81 Chief
Justice John Marshall construed the clause entirely differently. He
held that it gave Congress discretion to adopt any legislation "really
calculated to effect any of the objects intrusted to the
government."' 88
Other clauses are similarly nebulous. What is the meaning of, for
example, "cruel and unusual punishment," "due process of law,"
"privileges and immunities," "equal protection of the laws," "unrea-
sonable searches and seizures," "excessive bail," "just compensa-
tion," and "commerce"? Such constitutional words and phrases are
not self explanatory and often result in litigation. Nor does the use
of common words such as "speech," "press," "religion," and "prop-
erty," reveal constitutional meaning. Who in the constitutional pe-
riod could imagine that "freedom of expression" protects the mali-
cious burning of the American flag?' 89 Does the first amendment
prohibition against Congress passing any law "abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press" protect every utterance or printed sym-
bol? Is every restraint a law or an abridgment? It is obvious that the
words used in the amendment are far from absolute and precise in
meaning; surely they are not self explanatory. The kind of explana-
tion Bork seeks for the ninth amendment is nowhere to be found in
the document.
The Supreme Court's experience shows that confining its authority
solely to interpreting specified rights is not much of a restraint. To
be sure, the designation of a right serves as a limitation, whereas its
186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
187. See P. BREST & S. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAK-
ING 10-15 (1983).
188. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819).
189. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
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absence provides none. However, over the years, the Justices have
exercised considerable creativity in defining specified rights, as the
flag burning example illustrates, largely erasing this distinction. Bork
has written that most of the rights recognized by the Supreme Court
since 1920 have no root in the Constitution, and he particularly re-
fers to the Court's excesses with respect to, freedom of expression,
which of course is designated.1 0 The problem is not the absence of
specific protections as much as it is the absence of judicial restraint.
Bork and others have attacked the Supreme Court for securing the
right of privacy, which is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution.
Yet, Justice Douglas, author of Griswold v. Connecticut,' which
first found protection for this right, based his opinion on the com-
bined meaning of the first, third, fourth,, and fifth amendments.
Douglas asserted that named guarantees in these amendments "have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance."'' 2 He declined to premise the right of
privacy on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. He
condemned the pre-New Deal Court for acting like a superlegisla-
ture in safeguarding unenumerated economic rights under the due
process clause.' Thus, given their abundance of ingenuity and crea-
tivity, the absence of a particular guarantee hardly disables the Jus-
tices from discovering it as part of an enumerated guarantee.
A. Preserving Liberty
As the foregoing discussion reveals, a major role of the federal
judiciary is to preserve liberty, a mission that is very difficult as a
technical matter to perform. Since no constitutional liberties are ab-
solute, how do the Justices decide when either Congress or a state
has adopted a law abridging a person's freedom of speech, press, re-
ligion, or property? This determination is a matter of judgment,
which in the English speaking world judges have been exercising for
many centuries. Blackstone considered the problem in his discussion
of civil liberty:
[Civil liberty] is no other than natural liberty so far restrained by human
laws (and no farther) as is necessary and expedient for the general advan-
tage of the publick. Hence we may collect that the law, which restrains a
man from doing mischief to his fellow citizens, though it diminishes the
190. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1 (1971).
191. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
192. Id. at 484.
193. See id. at 481-82.
natural, increases the civil liberty of mankind: but every wanton and cause-
less restraint of the will of the subject, whether practiced by a monarch, a
nobility, or a popular assembly, is a degree of tyranny. Nay, that even laws
themselves, whether made with or without our consent, if they regulate and
constrain our conduct in matters of mere indifference, without any good end
in view, are laws destructive of liberty . . . . [T]hat constitution or frame
of government, that system of laws, is alone calculated to maintain civil
liberty, which leaves the subject entire master of his own conduct, except in
those points wherein the public good requires some direction or restraint.'
9 4
For Blackstone, a law that restrains liberty is acceptable only
when it furthers the public good. This is the theme of all rights juris-
prudence, and it requires intensive probing of both the person's and
the state's interests. In constitutional adjudication, this analysis
takes the form of tests to determine whether the legislative means
substantially achieve the legislative ends; whether the means and
ends are legitimate; and whether, when restraint is necessary, the
option utilized is the least onerous. Thus, Chief Justice Marshall de-
clared that for legislation to be constitutional, the end has to be le-
gitimate, and the means appropriate and plainly adapted to that
end. 95 Justice Washington's interpretation of privileges and immuni-
ties, 96 and the substantive due process and the clear and present
danger formulations all require inquiry along these lines. The con-
temporary Supreme Court will not countenance measures limiting
the exercise of fundamental liberties that cannot be vindicated under
rigorous application of these standards.
The model I have described for determining whether individual
liberties have been violated is rooted in Blackstone, and is consistent
with traditional legal rights jurisprudence. It is as follows:
In suits challenging the validity of restraints [upon human freedom], the
government would have the burden of persuading a court utilizing an inter-
mediate standard of scrutiny, first, that the legislation serves important gov-
ernmental objectives; second, that the restraint imposed by government is
substantially related to the achievement of these objectives, that is . . . the
fit between means and ends must be close; and third, that a similar result
cannot be achieved by a less drastic means.
197
Given the constitutional limitations affecting the federal govern-
ment, Congress must always find authority for its actions. Hence, in
litigation affecting liberties, Congress should have the burden to
show that the law it has passed is valid under the foregoing tests.
Although the issue is not as clear, it is my view that section 1 of the
fourteenth amendment shifts the burden of persuasion to the states
when they proscribe liberties. As I have reported, section 1 was in-
tended as an extensive restraint on the powers of the states with re-
spect to natural and fundamental rights. Moreover, allocating the
194. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *121-22.
195. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
196. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
197. B. SIEGAN, supra note 1, at 324.
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burden of proof is regarded as a question of policy and fairness. 9 '
The states should be required to provide persuasive justification
when they restrain liberty. Demanding that the aggrieved party as-
sume this burden operates to discourage freedom. Such a rule makes
it, as a practical matter, quite difficult for the individual to obtain
judicial vindication.199
Bork criticizes the judicial examination I favor as highly subjec-
tive and incapable of being construed under objective criteria.200
However, the purpose of the three-pronged model is to limit subjec-
tivity by dividing the inquiry whether liberty has been invaded into
relevant parts, rather than deciding it as a whole, without any partic-
ular restraints. A detailed decision will also provide greater guidance
for both legislators and judges.
Part of the judge's criticism is accurate: justices of equal compe-
tence, intelligence, and understanding will at times disagree in inter-
preting such tests. This is the experience of constitutional, as well as
of statutory and common law interpretation. All judicial opinions are
just that-opinions, about which disagreement is almost inevitable.
It is indeed rare when a constitutional interpretation obtains univer-
sal approval. Error is to be expected, but is acceptable, when under a
constitutional system which equates the public interest with liberty
and not with authority, it operates to limit governmental authority.
In determining whether liberty has been denied, the Constitution
would seem to require that the examination be tipped to favor its
protection.
198. According to Wigmore, the allocation of the burden of proof is merely a ques-
tion of policy and fairness based on experience in different situations. An important fac-
tor is that it should be borne by the party best able to know the truth or falsity of the
facts. 9 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2486, at 275 (3d ed. 1940). Such con-
siderations warrant that governmental authorities bear the burden of explaining and jus-
tifying why they have curbed property and economic liberties. Because I propose an in-
termediate standard of review, the state would confront a less arduous undertaking than
in the fundamental liberties area where strict scrutiny is required. See Justice Brennan's
discussion on the allocation of the burden of proof in school desegregation cases in Keyes
v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
199. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958); Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502, 548 (1934) (McReynolds, J., dissenting). The Court presently requires that
when fundamental liberties are involved the legislature carries the burden of proving that
the restraint is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.
200. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 225-29.
B. Judicial Excesses
Although the ninth amendment, the due process provisions, and
the other rights clauses of the fourteenth amendment are far reach-
ing, they do not provide a blank check for the judiciary-far from it.
There are two reasons for this: each of these provisions is limited in
meaning, and the judicial power is confined by the Constitution.
All of the said provisions are intended solely to strike down laws
that abridge the exercise of natural or fundamental liberties. They
do not relate to political liberties, that is, those liberties created by
the political process and not derived from individual initiative. Nor
are they limitations on the spending or taxing powers of the legisla-
ture. A major failing of the Supreme Court in contemporary years
has been in decisions requiring state and federal governments to pro-
vide monies and services for certain portions of the population, not-
withstanding that failure to so provide did not deny or deprive any
person of liberty. Although the federal judiciary has based such deci-
sions on both the due process and equal protection clauses, these
clauses have no bearing on the discretion of the legislature to appro-
priate funds for the public welfare. Maher v. Roe20' illustrates the
distinction that should be observed. When Justice Blackmun pro-
tested that Connecticut's failure to fund nontherapeutic abortions
denied an indigent woman her constitutional right, Justice Powell re-
plied that it was her poverty, not any law that caused the problem. 202
Moreover, in requiring government to spend or tax, or in monitor-
ing the provision or administration of government services, the judi-
ciary is exercising legislative or executive power, which is contrary to
the division of authority mandates of the Constitution. Article III
grants nothing other than specified judicial power to the United
States Supreme Court. Early judges and commentators construed ar-
ticle III to mean that in constitutional matters, the function of
judges was strictly and exclusively judicial. Judges were to be inter-
preters, exercising no more than a veto or a negative power over leg-
islation or execution of the laws. They had no authority to apply
201. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
202. Id. at 474. According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, "our cases have recognized
that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid,
even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of
which the government itself may not deprive the individual." DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Social Servs, 109 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1989). "Although the liberty pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause affords protection against unwarranted government
interference. . ., it does not confer an entitlement to such [governmental aid] as may be
necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
317-18 (1980). For instances when the Supreme Court has not followed this rule and has
instead imposed affirmative obligations on government under either the due process or
equal protection clauses, see Siegan, Separation of Powers and Other Divisions of Au-
thority Under the Constitution, 23 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1, 6-11 (1989).
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powers granted to the legislative and executive branches of the fed-
eral government or reserved to the state governments.20 3
In Federalist No. 81, Hamilton observes that judges who usurped
power could be impeached. 04 According to him, the judiciary was to
have no
influence over either the sword or the purse, no direction either of the
strength or the wealth of the society, and [could] take no active resolution
whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but
merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive
arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.20 5
I have elsewhere discussed the many deviations from the judicial
function that the Supreme Court has effected in contemporary
years.206 The Court has required state legislatures to spend for wel-
fare and education, and has altered congressional spending pro-
grams. It has overruled political decisions of the executive. It has
struck down state laws and regulations benefiting religion. It has ac-
ted as a superlegislature by requiring Congress and the states to pro-
vide overwhelming evidence-a compelling state interest-justifying
the imposition of regulation. Applying scrutiny to laws that is strict
in theory, but fatal in fact, preempts the authority of a coequal
branch charged with making the laws. No legitimate interpretation
of the ninth amendment, or of the privileges and immunities, due
process, or equal protection clauses allows for these violations of the
separation doctrine.
The High Court has also been derelict in its function of protecting
personal liberty. Regardless of constitutional language and purpose,
the Court has its own preferences on liberty, giving some very high,
and others very low priority. In particular, it has for all practical
purposes eliminated protection for the exercise of economic liberties,
those having to do with the production and distribution of goods and
services. As I have explained in prior writings, this policy runs
counter to the meaning of provisions in the original Constitution, the
Bill of Rights, and section 1 of the fourteenth amendment. 0 In any
event, establishing the priority of liberties is a political judgment af-
fecting the character of the society. Although Justices cannot be ex-
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pected to treat every interest and concern the same, excising from
protection liberties that affect substantial numbers of people is a de-
termination exceeding the scope of judicial discretion.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has exercised enormous power, hardly in
keeping with Hamilton's description of this branch as the "least dan-
gerous to the political rights of the constitution. ' 20 As it has turned
out, the Antifederalists were much more accurate in their assessment
that the Court would be extremely powerful and a threat to demo-
cratic government. The Antifederalists also were correct in their
fears that Congress would greatly reduce state sovereignty. Like the
Supreme Court, Congress is exercising extensive powers never envi-
sioned by proponents of the Constitution. The Federalists anticipated
that Congress' authority would be moderately exercised due to the
diversity of economic, political, and social interests to which it would
have to cater.20 9
The Framers' basic solution to the might of government was to
disperse and diffuse it. Probably their most important political ac-
complishment, the separation of powers, meant spreading authority
over and across government. The major difference between the gov-
ernment they established and the one that then existed in England
was that majorities were not supreme under ours. For their theory to
be effective, each branch had to be strong enough to check and bal-
ance the other two. The most salutary aspect of a powerful Supreme
Court is that it counters a powerful legislature. As Madison stated:
"Ambition must be made to counteract ambition." 210
Madison and his colleagues believed the legislatures harbored seri-
ous threats to freedom. Consider, for example, his observations in
Federalist No. 48: "The legislative department is everywhere ex-
tending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its im-
petuous vortex . . . ." "[I]t is against the enterprising ambition of
this department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy
and exhaust all their precautions." 2 '
Other leading Framers were no less apprehensive about
lawmakers. Hamilton condemned the state legislatures for failing to
safeguard commercial rights.212 Gouverneur Morris found in every
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state legislative department "excesses [against] personal liberty pri-
vate property [and] personal safety," '213 and Edmund Randolph
presented the Virginia Plan to the Convention to overcome the "tur-
bulence and follies of democracy. "214
According to Charles Grove Haines, in his authoritative work on
judicial review, a commonly held belief in 1787 was that the greatest
peril to liberty comes from the expanding powers of legislative
bodies:
[T]here was more concern as to the restrictions under which governments
should operate than as to the functions to be performed. Governments were
to be prohibited from interfering with freedom of person, security of prop-
erty, freedom of speech and of religion. The guaranty of liberty was, there-
fore, to give the rulers as little power as possible and then to surround them
with numerous restrictions-to balance power against power.21 1
On the other hand, the judiciary was considered the branch able to
maintain lawful prohibitions and restrictions upon exercise of unau-
thorized powers by other governmental bodies, as well as by individ-
ual officeholders.216 Accordingly, even if the Framers foresaw the im-
mense potential of the judiciary, they might nonetheless have
accepted it to counter the ever present legislative threat to liberty. In
the words of Hamilton:
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the constitu-
tion and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humours which
the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, some-
times disseminate among the people themselves, and which, though they
speedily give place to better information and more deliberate reflection,
have a tendency in the mean time to occasion dangerous innovations in the
government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the
community. 17
Turning to section 1 of the fourteenth amendment, there is far less
uncertainty as to what its Framers thought about the role of the
judiciary. The three rights clauses of this section are extremely
broad in language, according large discretion in their interpretation.
The speeches of the congressional proponents of the amendment re-
veal little concern in this regard. Supporters did not limit the judicial
power, notwithstanding the storm of criticism directed at the Dred
Scott decision.
One reason for this attitude is that the Framers intended the
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clauses to severely restrict the capacity of the states to stifle freedom.
In explaining the proposed amendment, Senator Howard and Repre-
sentatives Stevens and Bingham asserted that section I compre-
hended all the fundamental and natural liberties, and secured them
against state action. Other congressional supporters of the proposed
section agreed with or did not deny this interpretation.
How well the Supreme Court has performed its constitutional
mandate is a matter of great debate. Persons who should have access
to the courts are effectively denied it. And the Court engages in
practices belonging to other government bodies. However, when it
reviews laws and regulations that abridge individual liberties,
whether stated or not, it is implementing the Constitution, as written
and intended.
